Why do green hydrogen projects stall before investment?
Announced projects far outnumber funded ones. As of October 2026, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that announced low-emissions hydrogen projects could supply 27 million tonnes (Mt) a year by 2030, down from 37 Mt a year in its 2025 review. Projects that are committed or have strong potential fell from 10 Mt to just above 6 Mt (IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2026 and 2025).
Few projects reach FID. About 300,000 tonnes a year of extra production reached FID after the 2025 review, and new FIDs in production projects fell for the first time in 2025 (IEA, Global Hydrogen Review 2026). The IEA warns that 22 Mt of potential production could lose any chance of starting by 2030 if investment decisions are not made by early 2027.
The IEA names high costs, uncertain demand, unclear regulation and slow infrastructure as the causes (Global Hydrogen Review 2025). Those are market forces. Inside a project, four gaps often cause the stall. This is the authors' practitioner view, not an IEA finding:
The fix is to have shared assumptions and make earlier decisions. Adding people does not solve it. Late scope changes arrive as change orders under the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract.
A stage-gate process makes teams agree before the project commits money it cannot recover. Each gate has one question, a minimum set of outputs and a list of red flags. It is cheaper to stop a weak project at Gate 1 than at Gate 5.
Treat power as a design input from Gate 1. The IEA's Levelised Cost of Hydrogen Maps choose the cheapest mix of solar, wind and electrolyser size from hourly capacity factors, and add battery storage or curtailment where needed. The IEA has archived the maps and no longer updates them, so use them to learn the method, not to price your project (IEA, Levelised Cost of Hydrogen Maps).
The table below sets out seven gates:
Three transitions carry the most risk in this framework. They reflect the authors' experience and are not drawn from a published dataset.
Engineers optimise performance. Finance analysts optimise returns. Commercial leads optimise contract flexibility. Policy specialists check compliance, often only at gate reviews. Each does the job well, yet the models drift apart unless everyone works from one list of assumptions. Four lenses should stay in view together:
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><b>Lens</b></td>
<td><b>What it covers</b></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><b>Engineering</b></td>
<td><span style="font-weight: 400;">System integration, performance range, interface specifications between the electrolyser package and the BoP, operation across the renewable generation profile</span></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><b>Commercial</b></td>
<td><span style="font-weight: 400;">Offtake structure, volume flexibility, price indexation, force majeure and certificate delivery clauses</span></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><b>Finance</b></td>
<td><span style="font-weight: 400;">LCOH sensitivities, weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) targets, contingency, incentive eligibility and payment timing</span></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><b>Policy and certification</b></td>
<td><span style="font-weight: 400;">Emissions boundary, renewable electricity rules, MRV metering, audit-quality data governance</span></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
